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Early warning systems for outbreaks of infectious diseases are an important application of
the ecological theory of epidemics. A key variable predicted by early warning systems is the
final outbreak size. However, for directly transmitted diseases, the stochastic contact process by
which outbreaks develop entails fundamental limits to the precision with which the final size
can be predicted.
Methods and Findings
I studied how the expected final outbreak size and the coefficient of variation in the final size
of outbreaks scale with control effectiveness and the rate of infectious contacts in the simple
stochastic epidemic. As examples, I parameterized this model with data on observed ranges for
the basic reproductive ratio (R0) of nine directly transmitted diseases. I also present results from
a new model, the simple stochastic epidemic with delayed-onset intervention, in which an
initially supercritical outbreak (R0 . 1) is brought under control after a delay.
Conclusion
The coefficient of variation of final outbreak size in the subcritical case (R0 , 1) will be greater
than one for any outbreak in which the removal rate is less than approximately 2.41 times the
rate of infectious contacts, implying that for many transmissible diseases precise forecasts of
the final outbreak size will be unattainable. In the delayed-onset model, the coefficient of
variation (CV) was generally large (CV . 1) and increased with the delay between the start of
the epidemic and intervention, and with the average outbreak size. These results suggest that
early warning systems for infectious diseases should not focus exclusively on predicting
outbreak size but should consider other characteristics of outbreaks such as the timing of
disease emergence.
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The epidemiological responsibility to forecast disease
outbreaks is an onerous one. Because of the devastating
consequences and high costs of disease, predicting outbreaks
is a chief goal for public-health planning and emergency
preparedness. Thus, quantitative forecasting and develop-
ment of early warning systems (EWSs) for disease outbreak is
a high priority for research and development [1]. According
to the World Health Organization, the primary goals of EWSs
are to predict the timing of the outbreak and the magnitude
of the outbreak [1]. Intuition suggests that for directly
transmissible diseases, the magnitude of the outbreak will
be extremely difﬁcult to predict because of the stochastic
process of infectious contacts [2,3]. This idea is consistent
with the recent ﬁnding of Sultan et al. [4] that although the
timing of annual meningitis outbreaks in West Africa was
highly predictable, the ﬁnal outbreak size varied greatly from
year to year. Here I study fundamental limits to forecast
precision for (eventually) controlled outbreaks, ﬁrst theoret-
ically, then using nine well-studied infectious diseases as
examples. Finally, I consider a new model that more realisti-
cally represents actual outbreaks of emerging infections.
The reason that ﬁnal outbreak size is generally not
predictable is that the eventual dynamics of the outbreak
are highly sensitive to the seemingly random sequence of
infectious contacts and removal of infectious individuals in
the early, typically unobserved stages of the outbreak [3].
Clearly, the ﬁnal size of an outbreak depends on numerous
aspects of the social structure of the population, the
environment, and disease- or strain-speciﬁc characteristics.
Among the more important factors are seasonal climate
ﬂuctuations, transmissibility and virulence of the pathogen,
population dynamics and structure of the host population,
physiological and immunological status of potential hosts,
and the social networks of contacts between infectious and
susceptible individuals [5–8]. Accordingly, the deterministic
approach to epidemic modeling regards the spread of
infectious diseases as completely determined by the average
effects of these factors on the basic reproductive ratio (R0)
together with initial conditions. Deterministic models of
epidemics have provided insight into such important topics
as the design of vaccination campaigns and the effect of age
structure on epidemic dynamics [5]. From the perspective of
EWSs, the timing and average severity of outbreaks also might
be modeled quite accurately with deterministic models.
However, for emerging diseases or for diseases prone to
sudden outbreak, numerical predictions of ﬁnal outbreak size
derived from deterministic models will often deviate sub-
stantially from the observed outbreak size [3,9].
In contrast, the stochastic theory of epidemics represents
the population as a statistical ensemble with constant or
regular average properties but probabilistic changes in
disease status for individuals. As a result, properties of the
ensemble, such as the ﬁnal epidemic size, are probabilistic as
well [10–14]. Thus, stochastic models quantify the likelihood
of outbreaks that deviate from the expected ﬁnal size [9,15].
Such information about the variation in ﬁnal outbreak size—
its predictability—is crucial if disease forecasting is to be
relied upon for planning interventions.
The stochastic theory of epidemics can therefore be used to
understand the theoretical limits to forecasting precision for
disease outbreaks, including EWSs or forecasts based on the
developing epidemic curve as case reports accumulate. I
studied how precision in the forecasted ﬁnal outbreak size for
transmissible diseases depends on two dynamical features of
outbreaks: the contact rate (b) and the rate of removal (c)i n
the simple stochastic epidemic. Next, I developed models of
forecast precision for nine outbreak-prone diseases (chicken
pox, diphtheria, measles, mumps, poliomyelitis, rubella,
scarlet fever, smallpox, and whooping cough) and used
removal rate as a control parameter to relate intervention
effectiveness to ﬁnal outbreak size and forecast precision.
Finally, I developed a new model to understand how delays in




The simplest realistic model for outbreaks with a small
number of initially infectious individuals is the simple
stochastic epidemic with contact rate b and removal rate c,
which do not change appreciably over the time scale of the
outbreak [15,16]. This model is a good approximation if the
outbreak meets the following criteria, which are reasonable
for modern outbreaks that are rapidly controlled. First, we
assume that infectious contacts and removal of infectious
individuals are approximately independent in time so that
the outbreak is Markovian (compare [17–19]). Second, the
rate at which infectious individuals are removed from the
population exceeds the rate at which infectious contacts
occur (b , c). Finally, the population is sufﬁciently large that
the number of individuals ultimately infected is not more
than a negligible fraction of the susceptible population (i.e.,
per capita transmission rates are approximately independent
of the density of infected individuals). Then, the outbreak is a
homogeneous birth–death process (the simple stochastic
epidemic) with mean (M) and variance (V) of the ﬁnal
outbreak size given by [10]:
M ¼
c





ðc   bÞ
3 ð2Þ
Properties of the ﬁnal size distribution for other classes of
epidemics can be found in [11–14,17,20].
The solution given by equations 1 and 2 is for an outbreak
in which either (1) epidemiological parameters are naturally
such that always R0 , 1, or (2) public health policy is applied
consistently so that intervention is constant and under policy
conditions R0 , 1. For many emerging diseases this is not the
case. Rather, initially R0 . 1, but through intervention that
was established some measurable time after the outbreak
started, the reproductive ratio is reduced below the epidemic
threshold (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS]).
This case is considerably more complicated and, to my
knowledge, no simple formulas have been obtained for the
mean and variance of the ﬁnal outbreak size. However, it is
reasonably straightforward to solve the equations computa-
tionally, and a range of conditions can be studied. Below, I
consider a case that is more applicable to forecasting
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delayed-onset intervention in which there is a constant rate
of infectious contacts (b) and a removal rate (c) that depends
on the time since the outbreak began. Speciﬁcally, at the start
of the outbreak the removal rate is some value less than the
rate of infectious contacts and remains constant until some
intervention is applied a time t* t0 later, after which the
removal rate is some constant value greater than b, i.e.,
cðtÞ¼c1Iðt   t Þþc2Iðt.t Þ, where I is an indicator function
equal to one if its argument is true and zero otherwise. Then,
we can study the size of the outbreak as a function of the
control parameter t*, the time at which intervention is
initiated.
Analysis
A measure of precision should quantify the relative
magnitude of deviations from an expected value. The




=M is a measure of forecast
precision that can be interpreted as relative dispersion
independent of the magnitude of the data [21]. I used the
theoretical CV for ﬁnal outbreak size obtained from equations
1 and 2, which depends only on the ratio c/b¼R0
 1 and not on
the individual parameter values, to study how forecast
precision depends on outbreak characteristics and to estimate
forecast precision for nine infectious diseases under different
levels of control, represented by increasing c (see Figure S1).
This measure assumes b and c are known exactly. For
individual outbreaks, in which b and c are not precisely
known and the model is only an approximation to the
structure of the contact process, violations of modeling
assumptions such as the Markov assumption and the lack of
an explicit incubation period further erode forecast reliabil-
ity.Thusthismeasurerepresentsatheoreticalupperboundon
forecast precision that will not be attainable in practice.
Although every outbreak will be different as a result of
evolution of the etiological agent, changes in social behavior,
timing, and the ecological and geographical context in which
the outbreak starts, many epidemic parameters (most
famously R0), are reasonably conserved across outbreaks of
the same disease. Here, I treat the removal rate c as a control
parameter because it is crucially related to interventions, and
estimate b, which is assumed to depend on uncontrollable
aspects of the outbreak. The variable b,w h i c hi st h e
individual rate of infectious contacts [22], is related to the
transmission rate (b0) by the equation b ¼ b0N, where N is
total population size or density in the standard theory (e.g.,






Where removal results from recovery of the diseased
individual, we can estimate c from the duration of the
incubation (s1), latent (s2), and infectious (s3) periods with the
equation c ¼ð s1 þ s2 þ s3Þ
 1. Estimates of R0 have been
obtained for numerous directly transmitted diseases [5].
Assuming these estimates are based on the natural course
of the disease (i.e., without direct intervention), we can
rearrange this equation and substitute for c to obtain an
estimate of b:
^ b’R0=ðs1 þ s2 þ s3Þð 4Þ
Given that reported values for these variables vary some-
what, we put an upper bound on b by choosing the highest
reported value of R0 and the lowest reported values for the
different ss, whereas a lower bound is obtained from the
lowest reported value of R0 and the highest reported values
for the different ss. As a central estimate, I used the center of
the reported interval for each variable. Estimates of the
ranges of these quantities for several directly transmitted
diseases were compiled by Anderson and May ([5], Tables 3.1
and 4.1). Using these values, I used equation 4 to estimate
plausible ranges of b for nine directly transmitted diseases
(Table 1).
I also considered the delayed-onset intervention model
wherein initially b . c (the supercritical case in which
epidemic occurs with high probability), but after a time t* t0
intervention increases the removal rate c so b , c (the
subcritical case in which the outbreak is brought under
control). This model is a more realistic representation of
many emerging outbreaks (e.g., SARS, Foot-and-Mouth
disease, and Marburg virus). The solution to the simple
stochastic epidemic with delayed-onset intervention can be
obtained using generating functions for the probability
distribution of the size of the outbreak [10]. The variance of
the ﬁnal outbreak size is in terms of a multiple integral, which
was evaluated numerically (see Text S1). As an example, I
studied two situations with contrasting initial values for R0.
First, I studied the situation with b¼0.5 and c1¼0.25 (R0¼2).
Second, I studied the situation with b¼0.5 and c1¼0.45 (R0 ’
1.1). In both cases, c2 (the removal rate after intervention) was
one, so that post-intervention reproductive ratio was 0.5.
Results
The ratio c/b, the rate of removal compared with the rate of
infection, represents the relative effectiveness of interven-
tions. In the simple stochastic epidemic, the relative
effectiveness of intervention is always greater than one
because we assume that the outbreak is eventually controlled,
i.e., the assumption b , c above. Figure 1 conﬁrms the
intuition that ﬁnal outbreak size declines as the relative
effectiveness of intervention is increased. The CV in the ﬁnal
outbreak size, our measure of the imprecision with which the
ﬁnal outbreak size is forecasted, also declines with control
effectiveness. As a benchmark, a forecast might be deemed
reliable (in principle) where the CV is less than one, which
Table 1. Estimates of the Range of b for Nine Directly
Transmitted Diseases
Disease Minimum b Maximum b Central b
Chicken pox 0.175 0.387 0.272
Diphtheria 0.129 0.278 0.198
Measles 0.379 0.900 0.613
Mumps 0.135 0.500 0.288
Poliomyelitis 0.143 0.318 0.222
Rubella 0.128 0.500 0.289
Scarlet fever 0.206 0.296 0.250
Smallpox 0.115 0.250 0.176
Whooping cough 0.233 0.529 0.369
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030003.t001
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’2:41. Figures 2 and 3 show plots of
the ﬁnal outbreak size and the CV over the interval of
estimated bs for each of nine directly transmitted diseases. It
is important to underscore that the intervals in Figures 2 and
3 represent uncertainty about the value of the parameter b,
not variation from stochastic ﬂuctuations. Further under-
standing of these diseases might allow us to reduce this source
of uncertainty by obtaining more precise estimates. In
contrast, the CV in Figure 3 represents the range of ﬁnal
outbreak sizes that can result from the stochastic infection
process for a ﬁxed set of parameters. In principle, no amount
of detailed information about transmission or other ensem-
ble epidemic parameters can reduce this uncertainty.
Numerical analysis of the delayed-onset intervention
model showed that (1) the average outbreak size increased
with the delay between the start of the outbreak and the start
of intervention (Figure 4A), and (2) the CV (in our examples)
was everywhere greater than one and increased with the time
delay between the start of the outbreak and intervention, but
at a declining rate (Figure 4B). The ﬁrst result is straightfor-
ward: The delay between initial infection and intervention
increases the total number of secondary (tertiary, etc.)
infections that are increasing as a multiplicative process.
The explanation of the second result is that the CV in
outbreak size scales as the square root of the variance in
outbreak size and as the inverse of the average outbreak size.
As the average outbreak gets larger the CV increases but at a
declining rate (Figure 4C). This effect is mediated by the
reproductive ratio of the outbreak, so that the outbreak with
the lower R0 had a lower average outbreak size (Figure 4A),
but larger CV (Figure 4B and 4C). Thus, in the sense that the
CV measures the predictability of the outbreak, we found that
subcritical and controlled outbreaks (R0 , 1 and R0 close to
1, respectively) were less predictable (have lower CV) than
supercritical (R0 .. 1) outbreaks of comparable size.
Discussion
Using theoretical models, I found that unless controls are
extremely effective, limits to forecast precision result in
highly uncertain estimates of ﬁnal outbreak size. Speciﬁcally,
for the simple stochastic epidemic (subcritical case), unless
Figure 1. Expected Final Outbreak Size and CV in the Final Outbreak Size
as a Function of Intervention Effectiveness
The expected final outbreak size (solid line) and CV in the final outbreak
size (dashed line) are shown as a function of intervention effectiveness
(the ratio of the removal rate and contact rate c/b) for the simple
stochastic epidemic. The light horizontal line designates the benchmark
where CV ¼ 1.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030003.g001
Figure 2. Expected Final Outbreak Size for Nine Directly Transmitted
Diseases as a Function of the Removal Rate
The expected final outbreak size (y-axis) for nine directly transmitted
diseases is represented as a function of the removal rate (x-axis).
Estimates are bounded by minimum and maximum estimates (dashed
lines) of the contact rate b based on published estimates of R0.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030003.g002
Figure 3. CV in Final Outbreak Size as a Measure of Forecast Precision for
Outbreaks of Nine Directly Transmitted Diseases as a Function of
Removal Rate
The CV in final outbreak size (y-axis) is a measure of forecast precision,
shown here for outbreaks of nine directly transmitted diseases as a
function of removal rate (x-axis). Estimates are bounded by minimum
and maximum estimates (dashed lines) of the infectious contact rate b
based on estimates of R0. The horizontal line indicates CV ¼ 1.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030003.g003
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effective contact rate, the CV of ﬁnal outbreak size will be
greater than one. Imprecision in the delayed-onset inter-
vention model was typically even greater.
Reliable forecasts of outbreaks based on initial cases and/or
EWSs could potentially save many lives by increasing
preparedness for outbreaks when and where they are most
likely or most severe. According to the World Health
Organization, forecasts will be most useful when they
accurately predict the ﬁnal size of the outbreak [1]. However,
the ﬁndings reported here suggest that precise predictions
may be unattainable because of high variance in the ﬁnal
outbreak size of directly transmissible diseases, even under
the (unreasonable) assumption of perfect information about
macroscopic epidemic parameters.
This result does not apply to diseases that are not directly
transmitted (e.g., vector-borne illnesses) or to diseases in
which parameters change as the outbreak progresses (e.g.,
SARS [23]). Parameters might change for at least two reasons.
First, for emerging infections, about which little is known at
the start of the outbreak, increasing ability to diagnose and
treat infected patients and the dissemination of information
to the public will result in increasing the removal rate. Thus,
for example, in the 2003 SARS outbreak, the average lag
between onset of symptoms and hospital isolation was initially
around 6 d but declined to around 2 d by the fourth wk of the
outbreak [23,24]. Second, in outbreaks that ultimately infect a
large portion of the population, the rate of infectious
contacts will decline as the number of cases increases, diluting
the susceptible population. These examples represent im-
portant violations of modeling assumptions adopted here and
are represented by the inhomogeneous [10,22] and general
[15,16] stochastic epidemics respectively. Forecasting preci-
sion for these situations is an important topic for research.
Generally, these violations of the simple stochastic epi-
demic must be considered on a case-by-case basis. We studied
one realistic example (the simple stochastic epidemic with
delayed-onset intervention) in which an initially supercritical
outbreak (R0 . 1) is controlled by public health measures that
increase the rate at which infectious individuals are removed
from the population to a level ensuring the outbreak will
eventually die out. This is a reasonably realistic model for
dynamics of emerging infections with a short incubation
period. For two representative examples, we found that the
average outbreak size scaled approximately exponentially
with the delay between the start of the outbreak and the
implementation of intervention (note the log scale of the y-
axis in Figure 4A), underscoring the importance of rapid
intervention. Intuitively, when R0 was high the average
outbreak size increased faster than when R0 was low. We also
found that the CV in the ﬁnal outbreak size increased with
the lag between initial infection and control, but was smaller
in the case with high R0 than in the case with low R0. Indeed,
for the delayed-onset case with relatively high R0 (R0¼2) the
CV seemed to level off at a delay of around 15–20 d, although
this was not shown in the case with lower R0 (Figure 4B and
4C), probably because a longer delay would be required to
reach such an asymptote.
In conclusion, the fundamental limit to forecasting
precision obtained here represents only variation that results
from the stochastic contact process and not from uncertainty
about the underlying model or parameter values (compare
[3]). These sources of uncertainty will further diminish
precision. Further, these results underscore that rapidly
implementing control measures has value not only for
decreasing the ﬁnal size of the outbreak, which is the primary
goal, but also for decreasing variation in the ﬁnal size of the
outbreak, which is information that can be used to tailor
control measures and reduce potential losses. Although these
limits to forecast precision should lead to interpreting
predictions cautiously—whether derived from statistical
analysis, epidemic modeling, computer simulation, or expert
opinion—they should not hinder the development of greater
and more reliable systems for forecasting outbreaks of
infectious disease because there are many features of
outbreaks that might be reliably predicted.
Supporting Information
Figure S1. CV of Final Outbreak Size as a Function of R0
I was unable to obtain a simple relation for the coefﬁcient of
variation (CV) in the outbreak size of the subcritical simple stochastic
epidemic in terms of the basic reproductive ratio R0. Numerical
results conﬁrm that the CV of ﬁnal outbreak size depends only on the
ratio b and c (i.e., on R0). This plot represents the information in




Þ is the value
at which CV equals exactly one. In this sense, outbreaks with R0   R0*
are predictable while outbreaks with R0 . R0* are unpredictable.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030003.sg001 (18 KB PDF).
Text S1. Numerical Methods to Obtain Variance in Outbreak Size in
the Delayed-Onset Intervention Model
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030003.sd001 (102 KB PDF).
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Patient Summary
Background. Early warning systems that are used to look for outbreaks
of infectious diseases are important in public-health planning. One of the
most important things that such early warning systems try to predict is
the final size of the outbreak. However, for diseases transmitted directly
from person to person (rather than via a mosquito, for example), the
precision with which the final size can be predicted is often very low.
Why Was This Study Done? This researcher wanted to study how
predictable the final outbreak size of an epidemic is if the effectiveness
of control measures and the average number of infectious contacts are
known.
What Did the Researcher Do and Find? He developed a mathematical
model that took into account the variation in the infectiousness of nine
well-studied infectious diseases. He found that for any outbreak that
increases slowly, precise forecasts of the final outbreak size will be
impossible. This result was especially true for epidemics in which there
was a substantial delay in intervention after infection occurred, and the
precision of the forecast got worse as the delay between the start of the
epidemic and intervention increased, and with the average outbreak
size.
What Do These Findings Mean? These results suggest that early
warning systems for infectious diseases should not focus just on trying to
predict outbreak size because this estimate may be inaccurate, but
rather they should instead try to predict other characteristics of
outbreaks. These results will be of use to people trying to plan for
infectious disease outbreaks, but will not affect how patients are
managed individually.
Where Can I Get More Information Online? Based in the United States,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has a Web site that
gives background on how the CDC investigates disease outbreaks, along
with details of individual diseases:
http://www.cdc.gov
The World Health Organization has interesting information on early
warning systems:
http://www.who.int/csr/alertresponse/en/
In the United Kingdom, the Health Protection Agency has a similar
function and gives details on investigations of infectious diseases:
http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/
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